theory suggests that extraverts and neurotics are differentially sensitive to stimuli that generate positive and negative affect, respectively. From this theory it was hypothesized that efficacy of a standard positive-affect induction would be more strongly related to extraversion than to neuroticism scores, whereas efficacy of a standard negative-affect induction would be more strongly related to neuroticism scores. Positive and negative affect was manipulated in a controlled setting, and the effectiveness of the mood induction was assessed using standard mood adjective rating scales. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that neurotic Ss (compared with stable Ss) show heightened emotional reactivity to the negative-mood induction, whereas extraverts (compared with intraverts) show heightened emotional reactivity to the positive-mood induction. Results corroborate and extend previous findings.
With personality psychology undergoing a "decade of accomplishment" (Buss & Cantor, 1989) during what has also been called the "decade of emotion" (Tomkins, 1981) , it is not surprising that studies of the relationship between personality and emotion now form an identifiable subdiscipline of research. Several relatively strong and consistent findings have accumulated in this area. Among the most consistently replicated findings are the relationships between extraversion and average levels of positive affect and between neuroticism and average levels of negative affect. For example, Costa and McCrae (1980) found that extraversion traits correlate strongly with positive affect and that neuroticism traits correlate strongly with negative affect. These same relationships were also found in a follow-up study by Costa and McCrae (1980) , with extraversion predicting levels of positive affect 10 years later and with neuroticism predicting levels of negative affect 10 years later. These authors concluded that "extraversion. . . predisposes individuals toward positive affect, whereas neuroticism predisposes individuals toward negative affect" (Costa & McCrae, 1980, p. 673) . Very similar conclusions about the relationship between extraversion and positive affect, the relationship between neuroticism and negative affect, or both have been drawn by many other researchers (e.g., Emmons & Diener, 1985; Hotard, McFatter, McWhirter, & Stegall, 1989; Kendell, Mackenzie, West, McGuire, & Cox, 1984; Kirkcaldy, 1984; Meyer & Shack, 1989; OTVialley & Gillett, 1984; Thayer, 1989; Thayer, Takahashi, & Pauli, 1988; Warr, Barter, & Brownbridge, 1983; Watson, 1988; D. G. Williams, 1981) .'
The blending of personality and affective dimensions is highlighted by Tellegen's (1985) recent work. Tellegen viewed certain personality dimensions and certain affective tendencies to be so intermingled that he termed two of the most powerful second-order dimensions to emerge from his program of personality scale construction as positive and negative emotionality. Positive emotionality consists of extraversion-sociability traits (e.g., social potency, surgency, and activity) that appear to promote positive emotional experiences. Negative emotionality is associated with a number of primary neurotic traits, such as stress reaction, alienation, and self-descriptions of worry, anxiety, feeling victimized, and resentfulness. Such a neurotic trait cluster appears to foster negative emotional experiences. In discussing extraverted and neurotic trait clusters as representing a "preparedness to respond" (Tellegen, 1985, p. 697) with specific emotional reactions, Tellegen (1985) stated that "jointly these descriptive and conceptual schemes stress a view of personality ... as reflecting the influence of distinctive and pervasive positive and negative affective systems that give rise to [italics added ] both intra-individual variations in emotional state and inter-individual differences in emotionality" (p. 706).
The implication of the just-mentioned quotes from Costa and McCrae (1980) and Tellegen (1985) and implicit in much of the work in this area is the assumption that extraversion traits represent an inherent susceptibility to positive-affect states and neuroticism traits represent an inherent susceptibility to negative-affect states.
2 This implicit assumption was made explicit 1 Other personality dimensions have also been examined in relation to emotion, such as irrational beliefs (Cash, Rimm, & MacKinnon, 1986; Vestre, 1984) , internal-external locus of control (Benassi, Sweeney, & Defour, 1988; Lefcourt, Miller, Ware, & Sherk, 1981) , and Type A behavior pattern (Strube, Turner, Patrick, & Perrillo, 1983) . Nevertheless, the greatest volume of research, as well as the most consistent corpus of findings, have been generated on the relation between extraverted traits and positive affect and the relation between neurotic traits and negative affect.in a recent article by McCrae and Costa (1991) in which a distinction was made between a temperamental and an instrumental view of the relation between personality and emotion. The temperamental view holds that certain personality traits (i.e., extraversion and neuroticism) represent endogenous differences in sensitivity or response magnitude to positive-or negative-emotion stimuli, resulting in differences in long-term positive or negative affect. The instrumental view, on the other hand, holds that certain personality dimensions foster the creation of specific life circumstances and that these lifestyle differences, in turn, promote differential levels of long-term positive or negative affect. In the instrumental view, affective differences associated with personality are due to the indirect influence of personality through lifestyle differences, not inherent differences in sensitivity or response magnitude to positive-or negative-affect stimuli. The temperamental view, on the other hand, implies a direct influence of personality on the magnitude of phasic affective response to emotion-eliciting stimuli.
McCrae and Costa (1991) suggested that extraversion and neuroticism most likely play a temperamental (i.e., direct) role in fostering positive and negative affect, respectively, whereas other traits (e.g., conscientiousness and agreeableness) most likely play an instrumental (i.e., indirect) role in fostering the creation of life circumstances that, in turn, promote positive affect and minimize negative affect. However, because of the correlational nature of evidence generated so far, research reported to date on extraversion, neuroticism, and differential levels of positive and negative affect cannot distinguish the temperamental versus instrumental relation between personality and affect. What is necessary is an experimental approach to this question. The temperamental view of extraversion and neuroticism, if true, would imply that, when exposed to identical levels of positive-or negative-affect stimuli in a controlled laboratory setting, the magnitude of emotional response to these stimuli should be predictable from extraversion and neuroticism measures, respectively.
The purpose of the present study was to provide just such a test using experimental rather than correlational procedures. We hypothesized that extraversion (more than neuroticism) would be associated with an increased responsitivity to controlled inductions of positive (but not negative) affect. We further hypothesized that neuroticism (more than extraversion) would be associated with an increased responsivity to controlled inductions of negative (but not positive) affect. Before describing the details of our procedures, however, we first describe the theoretical foundation of these hypotheses.
Positive and negative affect emerge as separate dimensions accounting for the majority of variance in factor analyses of cross-sectional as well as longitudinal studies of emotion (Tellegen, 1985; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982) . The recent revision of the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1985) now provides separate positive-and negative-affect scale scores. It appears that positive and negative affect, especially when assessed over longer time periods , are orthogonal dimensions. As such, positive and negative affect can correlate differentially (not simply with opposite sign) with external variables such as personality, social activities, and physical symptoms (Watson, 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1985 ).
Gray's Theory of Personality and Emotion
Beyond a description of the temperamental relation between personality and affect, an important theoretical question remains as to why extraversion should be related to positive-affect reactivity and why neuroticism should be related to negative-affect reactivity? The work of Gray (1971 Gray ( , 1981 Gray ( , 1987 ) offers a theoretical rationale for predicting differential emotional susceptibility on the part of extraverts and neurotics. Gray contended that there are two neurologically based motivational systems responsible for many of the observed behavioral and emotional differences between extraverts and neurotics. One of these neuronal systems, the behavioral activation system (BAS), is thought to regulate behavior in the presence of signals of reward. The other system, the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), is thought to regulate behavior in the presence of signals of punishment. Gray suggested that individuals differ in the relative strengths of these two signal-sensitivity systems, with extraversion relating to a strong sensitivity to signals of reward and neuroticism relating to a strong sensitivity to signals of punishment. Other researchers have also conceptualized these signal-sensitivity systems in traitlike terms (Gorenstein & Newman, 1980; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989; Newman, 1987; Newman, Widom, & Nathan, 1985; Zuckerman, 1987) or as having behavioral consequences that represent trait dimensions (Fowles, 1980 (Fowles, ,1987 Zuckerman, 1987) .
The relevance of Gray's theoretical work to understanding differences in emotional susceptibility was also pointed out by Tellegen (1985) . Tellegen suggested that Gray's concepts of "reward-signal sensitivity and punishment-signal sensitivity appear to be quite consistent with respectively, the higher order Positive Emotionality and Negative Emotionality dimensions" (p. 699). It is thus consistent with Gray's theory to hypothesize that positive affect and negative affect are the state manifestations of reward-signal sensitivity and punishment-signal sensitivity, respectively. When exposed to signals of reward, one experiences positive affect, and when exposed to signals of punishment, one experiences negative affect. It seems plausible that individual differences in susceptibility to positive and negative affect could be the result of underlying individual differences in sensitivity to signals of reward and punishment.
Gray's theory is actually an expansion of Eysenck's (e.g., H. J. Eysenck, 1967) prior work on extraversion and neuroticism. H. J. Eysenck has long held that extraverts are likely to experience more positive affect than introverts and that neurotic individuals are likely to experience more negative affect than stable individuals (cf. H. J. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985, p. 141) . More recently, M. Eysenck (1987) suggested that extraversion represents susceptibility to positive affect and neuroticism represents susceptibility to negative affect. M. Eysenck cited Gray's work as a theoretical basis for this hypothesis. However, M. Eysenck offered no empirical work to support the hypothesis of differential susceptibility to positive and negative affect on the part of extraverts and neurotics.
A similar theoretical formulation of the relation between affect and personality was provided by Strelau (1987) . Strelau hypothesized that, because signals of reward are the source of positive affect, and because extraverts are more sensitive to signals of reward, extraverts should be more susceptible to positive affect than should introverts. Similarly, because signals of punishment are the source of negative affect, and because neurotics are sensitive to signals of punishment, neurotics should therefore be more susceptible than stable or nonneurotic individuals to negative affect.
This hypothesis of differential susceptibility to positive and negative affect was never actually tested by Strelau (1987) . If true, this hypothesis would account for the correlational findings that extraverts report more naturally occurring positive affect (but about the same amount of negative affect) than do introverts and that neurotics report more naturally occurring negative affect (but about the same amount of positive affect) than do stable subjects. The hypothesis of differential susceptibility to positive and negative affect goes further than simply predicting a correlation between personality dimensions and the frequency of specific affective states. Gray's theory implies that the tendency to experience differential levels of positive or negative affect depends on individual differences in specific neurological structures (i.e., the BAS and the BIS). These biologically based individual differences are the underlying hypothetical cause of both the affective states (positive and negative) and the personality dimensions (extraversion and neuroticism). If this hypothesis is indeed true, then extraverts should be more responsive than introverts to positive-affect inductions, whereas neurotics should be more responsive than stable individuals to negative-affect inductions. Stated differently, extraverts and introverts should show differential sensitivity to positive but not negative affect, whereas neurotics and stable individuals should show differential sensitivity to negative but not positive affect.
In the present study, we tested the just-stated hypotheses using an experimental rather than a correlational design. We used a standard laboratory mood induction procedure (guided imagery) to manipulate positive, neutral, or negative affect. We assessed emotional responsivity using a standard mood adjective rating task. If the affective implications of Gray's theory are correct regarding differential susceptibility to affective states, then we would find that extraversion is associated with a sensitivity to inductions of positive (but not negative) affect and that neuroticism is associated with a sensitivity to inductions of negative (but not positive) affect. In other words, the strength of our negative-affect induction should be more strongly related to neuroticism scores than extraversion scores, whereas the strength of our positive-affect induction should be more strongly related to the extraversion scores than to the neuroticism scores.
Method

Subjects
Subjects in this study were 359 undergraduate students who participated in partial fulfillment of requirements for their introductory psychology course. Participants were run through this study in small groups that ranged from 6 to 12 persons each. Each session lasted approximately 1 hr.
Personality Measure
We began the experimental session by having subjects complete several personality questionnaires, which took approximately 30 min to complete. This was done in part to equate subjects' experiences immediately before the mood inductions. That is, we wanted to control for differences between subjects in terms of arousal states at the time of the mood inductions by having them all sit quietly and complete personality questionnaires for 30 min. The personality measure of interest in this study was the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (H. J. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1972) . This 90-item true-false questionnaire has been extensively validated and widely used in personality research. It provided the extraversion and neuroticism scores used in our analyses.
Mood Induction Procedure
After completing the personality measures, subjects engaged in a task designed to influence their mood states. Imagery tasks were used as mood-induction procedures. This form of affect induction is common in studies involving laboratory mood manipulations (e.g., Delp & Sackeim, 1987; Larsen, Sinnett, & Kasimatis, 1988; Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989 ; J. M. G. Williams, 1980; Wright & Mischel, 1982) . Usinga between-subjects design, we used three mood-induction conditions: positive, negative, and neutral affect. Each induction condition involved having subjects read two written scenarios designed to induce the intended affect. We asked subjects to create a vivid image of themselves in each situation described by the scenarios. The written instructions asked subjects in the positive-affect condition to either imagine themselves winning $50,000 in a lottery and then taking a vacation to Hawaii or imagine themselves relaxing and feeling healthy and refreshed after a pleasant exercise session and then taking a walk on a beautiful day and finding a $5 bill. For the negative-affect condition, the written instructions asked subjects to either imagine themselves being expelled from school in an embarrassing manner and then having a close friend die from a painful and incurable disease or to imagine themselves being frustrated by having to sit through a boring and tedious lecture and then being sick in bed with the flu. Subjects in the neutral induction were asked to imagine visiting a supermarket and then taking an automobile trip on a highway.
We told subjects that the experiment concerned memory and personality. Before they read the affective scenarios, we told subjects that they would be asked to recall parts of the scenarios later and that if they could actually "get into the feeling" of each scene as they read and imagined it, then they should have better recall. Subjects were instructed to do the following:
Imagine the situation as vividly as you can. Picture the event happening to you. Try to imagine all the details of the situation. Picture in your "mind's eye" the surroundings as clearly as possible. See the people or objects; hear the sounds; experience the event happening to you. Think the thoughts you would actually think in this situation. Feel the same feelings you would feel in this situation. Let yourself react as if you were actually there.
After we gave them these instructions, we presented the subjects with a written description of one of the just-stated scenarios and gave them 4 min to read it, relax, close their eyes, and imagine being in that situation. We then gave the subjects the second scenario of the same hedonic tone (positive, negative, or neutral) to read and imagine for another 4 min. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three possible mood-induction conditions: positive, negative, or neutral. The only constraint on our randomization scheme was to assign approximately twice as many subjects to the hedonic conditions (positive and negative) than to the neutral condition, so that we could compare the effectiveness of the different hedonic images for inducing the intended affective state. Each subject received either two positive-affect scenarios, two negative-affect scenarios, or two neutral scenarios. Because we were able to administer the inductions using written scenarios, we were able to randomize individual subjects across conditions and ex-perimenters. There were two experimenters, each running an identical proportion of positive-, negative-, and neutral-induction conditions. The negative-affect condition included 145 subjects, the neutral condition included 70 subjects, and the positive-affect condition included 144 subjects.
Mood Measure
After they completed the imagery tasks, we gave the subjects a rating sheet that contained mood adjectives and asked them to "indicate how much of each mood you are feeling right now." The adjectives were selected to represent the domain of self-reported emotion as presented in Russell (Russell, 1978 (Russell, ,1980 , Watson and Tellegen (1985) , and Zevon and Tellegen (1982) . For the purposes of this study, we used six adjectives to measure negative affect (distressed, fearful, nervous, jittery, anxious, and annoyed) and six adjectives to measure positive affect (enthusiastic, excited, elated, peppy, euphoric, and lively) . These adjectives represent subsets of adjective sets used as measures of positive and negative affect by other researchers (e.g., the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, PANAS; Watson, 1988; Watson et al, 1988) . Positive and negative affect are the dimensions of mood most frequently associated with the personality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism in correlational research. Subjects rated each adjective on a 7-point unipolar response scale, with 0 anchored with not at all, 1 anchored with very slight, 2 with somewhat, 3 with moderate amount, 4 with much, 5 with very much, and 6 with extremely much. This response scale is similar to the 5-point unipolar response scale used on the PANAS and is almost identical to the 7-point unipolar response scale recommended by Mayer and Gaschke (1988) for the assessment of momentary positive and negative affect.
Results
Reliability and Intercorrelation of Mood Measures
Scale means, standard deviations, and alpha reliabilities for the mood measures are presented in Table 1 . The reliabilities of the positive-and negative-affect scales were satisfactory and comparable to the reliabilities obtained by other researchers using similar sets of adjectives designed to measure positive and negative affect . Because positive and negative affect are assumed to be 90° apart on the circumplex structure of self-reported emotion, the measurement model demands that the correlation between these scales be approximately 0. Across the entire sample, the intercorrelation between positive and negative affect was .23. This relatively small corre- Note. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect.
lation implies that our adjective sets that were designed to measure positive and negative affect approach the level of orthogonality demanded by the circumplex model of self-reported affect. This is not surprising given that our adjectives are a subset of adjectives used by others to assess positive and negative affect as orthogonal constructs .
Effectiveness of Mood Induction Procedures
To assess whether the affective imagery tasks produced the intended effect on subjects' moods, we conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the three mood induction conditions. This was done separately for positive affect and then negative affect as the dependent variables. Mean levels of positive and negative affect in each of the three induction conditions are also presented in Table 1 . The ANOVA on positive affect revealed a significant main effect for mood induction condition, F(2, 353) = 25.72, p < .001. This was followed up with planned comparisons, using the Schefle multiple range test, to examine whether the main effect was due to a large effect in a single condition. The planned comparisons revealed that, in terms of the positive-affect measure, subjects in the positive-affect induction condition scored significantly (p < .05) higher than subjects in the neutral-affect induction condition but that the negative-affect induction subjects were not significantly different from the neutral-affect induction subjects. This implies that the positive-affect measure is sensitive mainly to changes in positive affect, as would be predicted from the circumplex measurement model of affect (Larsen & Diener, in press ). This sensitivity or discriminant validity of positive affect as a measure of positive (but not negative) affect is desirable for an adequate test of the differential susceptibility hypothesis. Another ANOV\ conducted on negative affect also revealed a significant main effect for mood induction condition, .F(2, 353) = 25.41, p < .001. Planned comparisons revealed that, in terms of the negative-affect measure, subjects in the negative-affect induction condition scored significantly higher than subjects in the neutral-affect induction condition (p < .05) but that the subjects in the positive-affect induction were not significantly different from the subjects in the neutral induction. This implies that the negative-affect measure is sensitive mainly to changes in negative affect, as again would be predicted from the circumplex model of affect. This sensitivity or discriminant validity of negative affect as a measure of negative (but not positive) affect is also desirable for an adequate test of the differential susceptibility hypothesis.
Differential Susceptibility to Positive and Negative Mood Induction Procedures
The major hypothesis under investigation is that the strength or effectiveness of the positive-affect induction should be better predicted from extraversion scores than neuroticism scores, whereas the strength or effectiveness of the negative-affect induction should be better predicted from neuroticism scores than extraversion scores. We computed correlations between the personality variables (extraversion and neuroticism) and the self-report of mood after the mood induction procedures. We computed these correlations separately for the positive-, neu-tral-, and negative-affect induction conditions, and we present them in Table 2 .
The correlations in Table 2 indicate that neuroticism shows the strongest relationship to affect when negative affect is manipulated and measured. Extraversion, on the other hand, shows the strongest relationship to affect when positive affect is manipulated and measured. In other words, the effectiveness of the positive-and negative-affect inductions differed depending on personalities of the subjects; extraversion is associated with the greater positive-affect reactivity to the positive-affect induction but not negative-affect reactivity to the negative-affect induction. Neuroticism is associated with the greater negative-affect reactivity to the negative-affect induction but not positiveaffect reactivity to the positive-affect induction. This suggests that if one wanted to predict the effects of a mood induction procedure from personality scores, one would be better able to predict negative-affect reactivity to a negative-affect induction from neuroticism rather than extraversion scores, whereas the positive-affect reactivity to a positive-affect induction would be better predicted from extraversion rather than neuroticism scores. This lends some support to the hypothesis that positiveaffect inductions should be more effective for extraverts than for neurotics, whereas negative-affect inductions should be more effective for neurotics than for extraverts.
The just-mentioned correlations indicate that extraversion and neuroticism significantly predict emotional reactions within the mood-induction conditions. Another way to examine the question of differential susceptibility to affective states is to look at personality differences in mean levels of emotional reactivity in the different mood-induction conditions. 3 We created high and low groups on both the extraversion and neuroticism scales by dividing the sample at the median on these two dimensions; that is, introverted and extraverted groups were created by splitting the sample at the median on the extraversion score. Similarly, we created stable and neurotic groups by splitting the same sample at the median on the neuroticism score. Because extraversion and neuroticism were correlated at .09 in this sample, it seemed appropriate to use the medians to create high and low groups. In the comparisons that follow, we compared the groups created by splitting the sample on the extraversion scale and then compared the groups created by splitting the same sample on the neuroticism scale. Each subject in the sample thus appears in both comparisons. We conducted ANOVAs using a 2 (high vs. low extraversion) X 3 (positive-vs. neutral-vs. negative-mood induction condition) factorial design. Positive and negative affect were entered as dependent variables in separate ANOV\s. For positive affect, there was a significant main effect for mood induction condition, F(2,353) = 24.47, p< .001, as well as a significant main effect for extraversion, F(\, 353) = 8.69, p < .005. More important to our hypothesis is that the interaction of extraversion and mood induction condition produced a significant effect, F(2, 353) = 3.59, p < .03. Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that this significant interaction effect is due to extraverts showing a greater positive-affect responsiveness than introverts in the positive-affect induction condition but relatively no greater responsiveness in the negative-affect induction condition.
A similar ANCAA. was conducted using neurotic versus stable as the personality factor, again with positive affect as the dependent variable. Again there was a main effect for induction condition, F(2, 353) = 21.44, p < .001, but no significant (p < .05) effect for neurotic versus stable and no significant interaction term. This suggests that neurotic subjects did not show differential positive-affect responsivity to the mood-induction manipulations, relative to the stable subjects.
When we turned to an analysis of negative-affect responsitivity, we found an opposite pattern of results. For negative affect as the dependent variable, the 2 X 3 ANOV\ on the neurotic versus stable personality factor across the three induction conditions produced significant main effects for both the induction condition, F(2, 353) = 28.31, p < .001, and the personality factor of neurotic versus stable, F(\, 353) = 19.41, p < .001. More important, the interaction between the neuroticism factor and the mood induction factor was also significant, F(2, 353) = 3.28, p < .05. This interaction implies that neurotics were more negative-affect responsive than stable subjects and that this was particularly the case in the negative-affect induction condition.
A similar ANONft. that used extravert versus introvert as the personality factor, again with negative affect as the dependent variable, revealed a nonsignificant (p > .05) interaction effect. There was again a main effect for induction condition, F(2, 353) = 23.53, p < .001, as well as a main effect for extraversion personality factor, F(l, 353) = 7.40, p < .01. However, extraverts (compared with introverts) did not exhibit differential negativeaffect reactivity as a function of type of mood-induction condition.
Note. PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect. *p<.05. **p<.01. 
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to examine the differential susceptibility or vulnerability to positive-and negativemood induction procedures and how these differences might relate to the personality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism. Much previous correlational research has found that extraversion is consistently related to heightened levels of positive affect and that neuroticism is consistently related to heightened levels of negative affect (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1980) . Using mood adjective rating tasks, such correlational research usually asks subjects how they typically feel. Results of previous research suggest that the extraverted subjects typically report more positive affect (but about the same amount of negative affect) than introverts, whereas the neurotic subjects typically report more negative affect (but about the same amount of positive affect) than stable subjects. The question this correlational research leaves unanswered is: Are these differential correlations with positive and negative affect on the part of extraversion and neuroticism due, in fact, to differential emotional susceptibility to positive-and negative-affect stimuli? Previous research does not rule out the possibility that extroverts create life circumstances that, in turn, foster frequent positive-affect experiences. For example, extraverts may be more likely than introverts to engage in social activities, and engaging in social activities may be the source of frequent positive affect. Similarly, neurotics may be more likely than stable individuals to create life situations that, in turn, foster frequent negative-affect experiences. For example, neurotics are more likely to engage in self-recrimination, doubt, and thoughts of resentfulness. Such behaviors may be an indirect source of frequent negative affect. Extraverts and neurotics may differentially create or choose to enter into different life situations (Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984; Snyder, 1981) , and it may be these situations that bring about differential levels of positive or negative affect. Thus, extraversion and neuroticism may not directly promote positive and negative affect by fostering differential susceptibility or responsivity to positive-and negative-affect stimuli, respectively, but rather may indirectly foster positive-and negative-affect experiences by promoting life situations that, in turn, result in the frequent experience of positive or negative affect (McCrae & Costa, 1991) .
Many researchers in this area (e.g., M. Eysenck, 1987; McCrae & Costa, 1991; Strelau, 1987; Tellegen, 1985) nevertheless assume that extraversion and neuroticism are manifestations of biologically based systems that directly promote differential susceptibility or responsivity to positive-or negative-affect stimuli. If this is true, then, in addition to the correlational evidence just cited, extraversion should predict positive-affect responsivity to positive emotional stimuli, and neuroticism should predict negative-affect responsivity to negative emotional stimuli. In other words, it can be hypothesized that extraversion should be associated with a higher probability of experiencing positive-affect states and neuroticism should be associated with a higher probability of experiencing negative-affect states during controlled exposure to positive and negative emotional stimuli, respectively. The notion that extraversion and neuroticism represent dimensions of differential preparedness to respond to positiveand negative-affect stimuli, respectively, should be examined experimentally.
Our hypothesis has its theoretical foundation in Gray's (1981) emotion-based model of personality. Gray (1981 Gray ( ,1987 postulated the existence of two brain systems (the BAS and the BIS) that control sensitivity to signals of reward and sensitivity to signals of punishment, respectively. These two systems are assumed to give rise to the personality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism, respectively. According to this theory, extraversion is based in a heightened sensitivity to signals of reward (the BAS) and neuroticism is based in a heightened sensitivity to signals of punishment (the BIS). 4 One could further assume that sensitivity to signals of reward is experientially manifest in heightened positive emotional reactions, whereas sensitivity to signals of punishment is experientially manifest in heightened negative emotional reactions. This assumption has been made by others (e.g., M. Eysenck, 1987; Strelau, 1987) but has never been empirically tested. The empirical hypotheses that follow are that extraverts (compared with introverts) should show heightened reactivity to positive (but not negative) mood-induction procedures, whereas neurotics (compared with stable individuals) should show heightened reactivity to induction procedures for negative (but not positive) mood.
In the present study, we examined these hypotheses by exploring differential reactivity to induction procedures for positive and negative mood in a controlled laboratory setting. Introverts and extraverts were found to differ significantly from each other in their affective reactivity to the positive-but not the negative-mood induction. Neurotic and stable individuals differed from each other significantly only in their affective reactivity to the negative-but not the positive-mood induction. We were thus better able to predict the efficacy of the positivemood induction from extraversion rather than neuroticism scores, whereas we were better able to predict the efficacy of the negative-mood induction from neuroticism scores rather than extraversion scores.
The results of our study are consistent with Gray's psychobiological theory, especially as interpreted and elaborated by Fowles (1980 Fowles ( ,1987 and Tellegen (1985) . The BAS and the BIS are stimulus-sensitivity systems assumed to influence the probability of specific affective states. Because Gray's two stimulussensitivity systems are also assumed to form the biological basis of extraversion and neuroticism, we suggest that these personality dimensions represent vulnerability or susceptibility to specific affective states. It appears that different persons are differentially prepared to respond with specific emotions when given the same stimulus conditions. This theoretical position suggests that extraversion is associated with a preparedness to respond with stronger positive than negative affect under the appropriate circumstances, whereas neuroticism is associated with a preparedness to respond with stronger negative than positive affect under the appropriate circumstances.
Results from the present experiment, in which laboratory mood-induction procedures were used, can account for previous correlational findings that extraverts experience more positive than negative affect in their lives over time, and neurotics experience more negative than positive affect in their lives over time. Our results thus provide experimental support for Costa and McCrae's (1980) 
Extroverted traits contribute to one's positive enjoyment... although they do not generally appear to reduce the unpleasantness of adverse circumstances. Neurotic traits predispose one to suffer more acutely from one's misfortunes, but they do not necessarily diminish one's joy or pleasures, (p. 674)
There are theoretical advantages to relating personality traits to emotion concepts. When specific personality traits are conceptualized as mood-dispositional dimensions, understanding of the affective organization of various personality-relevant phenomena may increase. For example, the nature of psychological well-being may be understood as due to the interacting influence of the two signal-sensitivity systems. There may be two routes to maintaining psychological well-being: (a) being relatively insensitive to the disorganizing influence of unpleasant emotional stimulation, or (b) being especially responsive to pleasant emotional stimulation. This logic is implicit in the model of well-being presented by Costa and McCrae (1980) and has also been discussed by Meehl (1975) and Tellegen (1985) . Meehl suggested that discrete brain structures are responsible for controlling the dual capacities for pleasure and pain. If these hedonic capacities are orthogonal, as suggested by current research on emotion (Watson, 1988 ; as well as the results of the present study), then individuals with the highest probability for obtaining overall psychological well-being are those with a low capacity for negative affect (nonneurotic or stable individuals) 4 Although Gray's approach is a reformulation of H. J. Eysenck's (1967) theory, the two theories make very similar predictions regarding individual differences in the manifestation of emotional reactions. For example, H. J. Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) argue that extraverts are prone to experience elevated levels of positive affect, whereas neurotics are prone to experience elevated levels of negative affect (p. 141). The major differences between Gray's and H. J. Eysenck's theories involve the biological mechanisms responsible for these differential emotional reactions and the precise location of these individual differences in the two-dimensional space defined by the major personality factors. combined with a high capacity for positive affect (extraverted individuals). Stable extraverts may thus be biologically equipped for the highest probability of experiencing psychological well-being, given the appropriate circumstances.
Affective states do not exist in a vacuum; that is, stimuli with hedonic potential are necessary to trigger affective reactions. It is unlikely that even a stable extravert would experience longterm well-being if no pleasurable stimuli were forthcoming from the environment. The present results suggest that, given the appropriate stimuli, the personality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism are related to differential manifestation of positive and negative affect. Such differential hedonic capacities may be due to a lowered sensitivity to hedonic stimuli or to an increased magnitude of hedonic response. That is, one question raised by the present results is whether the obtained effects are due to the stimulus sensitivity or the response magnitude side of the stimulus-response equation. For example, did our extraverts report more positive-affect response to the positivemood induction because they have a lower threshold for pleasurable stimuli (i.e., are more sensitive to pleasurable events) or because they are more prepared to manifest a higher magnitude positive-affect response to pleasurable events? Similarly, did our neurotic subjects report more negative-affect response to the negative-mood induction because they have a lower threshold for unpleasant stimuli (i.e., are more sensitive to unpleasant events) or because they are more prepared to manifest a higher magnitude negative-affect response to unpleasant events? In discussing our results, we have used both of these explanations, and they may in fact both be correct. Future researchers might attempt to disentangle whether the direct personality effects on emotional reactivity demonstrated in this study are due more to differential stimulus sensitivity or to differential response magnitude. Regardless of this issue, our results do implicate the personality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism as playing direct temperamental roles in fostering differential hedonic capacities. This implication goes beyond the correlational evidence gathered to date on the relation between personality and emotion.
